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Abstract

Title: Auditing’s Ripple Effects: Divergence After Enron
The Enron scandal received considerable attention over the past 10 years (2001-2011), and the
fallout from Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia was severe. Both auditors and accountants lost the
trust of the government and the public. This caused the government to intervene by enacting the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and creating the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee
the audits of public companies. This study will examine how the differences in perspectives
amongst gender, as well as public and GCAS auditors, factors into personal opinions by
administering a research survey and studying literature surrounding the Enron scandal.
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Auditing’s Ripple Effects: Divergence After Enron

The Enron scandal, as well as similar financial scandals, is an event that has changed
the landscape of auditing. The trust of the public was lost and harsh sanctions were imposed.
Explored in many novels, documentaries, as well as the entertainment industry, the Enron
scandal took center stage as individuals searched for answers. Our society today was much
impacted by the actions of Arthur Andersen and Enron. In fact, as time has progressed and
rules become ever more all encompassing, many auditors wonder if the profession will ever
once again control its own destiny. The government’s intervention came through enacting the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and creating the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. These
actions were designed to oversee the audits of public companies and would change the face of
auditing as we know it. How have auditors responded to the public outcry? What are their
thoughts on the Enron scandal, and how can we learn to use this for future application. This
study will examine these differences and seek to answer the questions associated with them.
The Enron scandal was made possible by the collusion of both the Enron management
team, as well as Arthur Andersen auditors assigned to the account. Mark-to-market accounting,

4
offshore entities, cooked books, and non-audit services all lead to the ultimate bankruptcy of
Enron. The first of these, mark-to-market accounting, “meant that once a long-term contract was
signed, the present value of the stream of future inflows under the contract was recognized as
revenues and the present value of the expected costs of fulfilling the contracts were expensed.1”
In essence, Enron would note profits on their books before they’d actually realized them. The
offshore entities were used by Enron to avoid taxes and hide debt or losses that had been
accrued. Both mark-to-market accounting and offshore entities enabled Enron to ‘cook the
books,’ to in essence make their company look better than what they actually are in order to keep
investors and stockholders happy. Arthur Andersen, which should have been watching to ensure
this did not happen, failed to recognize the signs. In addition to audit services, Arthur Andersen
also provided non-audit services,2 which severely put in to question their independence. It has
been interesting to note however, that public outcry was addressed more forcibly to the Arthur
Andersen auditors than to Enron management. This was due to an “expectation gap” that the
public holds. An “expectations gap” is the difference between what users of financial statements,
the general public perceives an audit to be and what the audit profession perceives an audit to be
as they are conducting the audit.3 The public seemed to accept and perhaps even expect that
corporation’s top management might try to be crafty. However, they had high expectations that
auditors assigned to the case would be able unravel the manipulations that might be done. When
Arthur Andersen failed to uncover this and when it was revealed during the trial, “that Andersen
shredded hundreds of pounds of Enron documents even though it knew that the Securities and

1

Paul Healy& Krishna Palepu, The Fall of Enron, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(2), 2003, p. 11.
John Coates, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(1),
2007, p. 105.
3
Marianne Ojo, Eliminating the Audit Expectations Gap: Myth or Reality? Journal of Forensic Accounting Volume
VIII, December 2007.
2
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Exchange Commission had begun looking into Enron,4” the public saw these actions and
believed that Andersen had attempted to hide the scandal. As a result, the public lashed out at
Arthur Anderson, causing the entire auditing profession to take a major hit.
The full impact of the Enron scandal, and the fallout that would result from similar
scandals such as WorldCom and Adelphia, was unprecedented. As Brewster put it, “the
accounting profession had the respect of the public one day and the derision of the public the
next…All CPAs…were caught in a profession changing too fast for them to keep up.5” Before
these scandals, the accounting profession enjoyed the ability to self-regulate able to set any
standard they wanted. The global firms had a lot of latitude in the standards by which they
wished to operate. This was due to a number of factors; one being that there had been no limits
on the concentration of the accounting industry. In essence, these global firms had a lock on the
market and were able to purchase or merge with any firm that even appeared to compete with
them. As headlines continued to fill with prominent companies involved in financial scandals
and bankruptcies, Congress knew that it had to take action. It did so on July 25,2002 when it
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act6. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was designed to fix the auditing of
public companies, and created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), to
oversee and regulate auditing. The PCAOB oversees auditors and their actions through enlisting
auditors to enforce existing rules against theft or fraud by corporate officers with the Securities
and Exchange Commission overseeing public companies.7.
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As my study’s aim is to look at the perceptions of auditors, in order to really take a look
at the purposes surrounding the Enron scandal I prepared a survey. The original intent for my
survey was to distribute it to the auditors within the Michigan Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
Association, however, that plan ultimately did not prove successful, requiring me to look at an
alternative source. With that in mind, I decided to distribute the survey to auditors from the
General Conference Auditing Service (GCAS) and CPAnet.com. GCAS took the role of a
private, not-for-profit firm, whereas CPAnet.com took the role of public auditors. The
respondents from CPAnet had a wider background than the respondents from GCAS, being as
they were from many different backgrounds and specialties. The work done by the General
Conference Auditors was much narrower in scope as they are auditors working for the church, as
opposed to auditors from a conglomerate of not-for-profit organizations. While GCAS auditors
may come from different backgrounds, it would be inaccurate to call them a sample of auditors
within the private, not-for-profit field of auditing. A larger sample would need to be done
whereby respondents are pulled from many different private, not-for-profit jobs, such as
governmental, other church denominations, or charities. If my survey had been able to draw
those respondents, it would have more accurately portrayed the private sector of accounting. On
the public sectors side however, we had more variety from our respondents, with participants
from both the bigger and smaller firms. The restriction to the public sectors reach however was
that they were members of CPAnet, so while that did garner participants, it should be noted that
not all auditors within the public field of auditing are members of CPAnet.
My survey consisted of 15 questions to which respondents could answer yes, no, or
answer based on a likert scale that ranged between 1-5, with 1 being strongly disagree and 5
being strongly agree. All information was then correlated and compared primarily on basis of
average. A T-test was used to determine which of the results were statistically significant at the

7
.05 level of significance with comparisons made on a basis of gender or public accountants and
auditors versus General Conference auditors. A comparison by effect size was also run. Whilst
correlating the results it was important to keep in mind that those auditors within GCAS were a
very focused subgroup of the larger group of private, not for profit auditors.
There were several limitations that constrained the scope of my survey. Firstly, my study
had a very small sample size of 34 respondents. It was this fact that made it necessary to operate
more on mean as opposed to T-tests. While T-tests were done, with a total of 30 being run from
the data gathered, we also had to account for type-1 errors, or false-positives. In order to
counteract false-positives, a Holm-Bonferroni was run to mitigate the impact. It is important to
note that while the Holm-Bonferroni will reduce the number of false-positives, it will not be able
to account for false-negatives that also could have been a factor due to my small sample size.
The equation for Holm-Bonferroni is demonstrated by the equation below.

S1≤
This method involves arranging the p-value for all tests run in order of significance. Those with
the highest p-values, those that were least likely to occur were listed first and so on down the list.
The level of significance with which this test was conducted was then divided by the number of
tests ran, decreasing by one each time so that while n=30 on the first application of the HolmBonferroni method, for the second application n=29. In this way, we were able to narrow down
the results by eliminating type-1 errors that may have proved positive due to the number of Ttests that were ran. The table below demonstrates my application of the Holm-Bonferroni
method, with yellow showing p-values from GCAS and public auditors, while blue applied to
male and female auditors. The numbers next to the p-value correspond to the question asked
(Appendix 1).
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As you can see, only two results were found to be significant after having the Holm-Bonferroni
correction applied, something we will look into more during the results analysis below.
Another limitation of my survey was the fact that the participants were self-select. In
other words, participants chose to participate in the survey as opposed to it being a simple,
random survey. Therefore the results I received could have been skewed or otherwise impacted
by the participants who elected to complete the survey. The final limitation of my survey was the
fact that the questions were limited to those we were able to decide upon, that being 15. Further
researchers may wish to do a survey that is broader in its scope in order to better cover the Enron
scandal and the perceptions of the auditors impacted by the scandal.
Now that we have taken a brief look at the limitations of my survey, we will examine the
results. As I conducted my survey, there were two ways I categorized the responses, by gender
and field. As stated previously, I had a total of 34 respondents. These 34 respondents were
broken down into 20 male participants, 13 female participants, 15 GCAS auditors, and 19 public
auditors from the CPAnet website. While there were other demographics I would have liked to
analyze, due to a limited sample size, they were not included in my final research. The first way
we will analyze is by gender. Amongst male and female participants, there did seem to be a
difference in how they responded; however due to the size of my sample that could also be a
false positive. The table below shows the mean of responses by gender.
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Part of my original hypothesis was that men would react differently than women to the questions,
for some this seems to apply, but again, due to my small sample size I am unable to definitively
conclude that men respond differently than women. Though T-Tests are not typically applied to
such a small sample size, I applied it to this study in order to examine what the results may yield.
Due to the large amount of tests that I had to run, it was also necessary to run a Holm-Bonferroni
correction in order to correct for type-1 errors. The table below shows our p-values before and
after the Holm-Bonferroni correction was run.

As you can see, due to the small sample size only one of our questions, question two (Appendix
1) has been seen as significant. Females tended to on average, agree more with question 2 than
men.
The next way we will examine our results is by comparing GCAS auditors to public auditors that
responded from CPANet. Amongst GCAS auditors and public auditors there seemed to be a
larger difference than amongst male and female auditors that was surprising though not
unexpected due to the fact that sanctions were imposed upon public companies and auditors as
opposed to not-for-profit companies and auditors. As the table below shows, GCAS auditors
tended to respond differently than public company auditors.
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Though T-tests are not typically applied to a small sample size, they were ran in order to
determine which of the questions might be good to research in the future. It was also necessary to
apply the Holm-Bonferroni method to account for type-1 errors. The table below shows the TTests results before and after the Holm-Bonferroni correction was run.

As you can see, the results before applying the correction was more drastic than in the previous
example which suggests that there is a more pronounced difference amongst GCAS and public
auditors. However once again, due to my rather small sample size not much can be said other
than to say that this could benefit from a larger research study and sample size.
In order to examine results in another way, I utilized cohens-d method for effect size. The
formula, as shown below, involves subtracting the means and dividing by the standard deviation.

Effect size can help to convey the estimated magnitude of a relationship and also complements
inferential statistic methods such as p-values. Effect size also helps in power analysis and allows
researchers to summarize findings within their research. For the purposes of my research I
divided my questions up into three categories: auditor perception, public perception, and the
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reaction to reform. In effect size, anything above a .5 is moderately strong, with anything above
.8 being strong, positive or negative values are also irrelevant and dependent upon the way a
question was worded. The first table we will look at is auditor perception.

While none of the results are strong, a few of them are moderately strong and point towards a
need for further research into auditor perception of what occurred at that time. The next table we
will look at is public perception.

The results in this table tended overall to be stronger. These questions asked auditors to answer
how they felt the publics perception of them was. This would definitely be an area I would
suggest for further research due to the stronger effect size results, especially in differences
between public auditors and GCAS auditors. The final table we will look at to compare effect
size is their reaction to reform.
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As the results show, reform reaction tends to be stronger amongst public auditors and GCAS
auditors as opposed to male and females, though there was a moderately strong difference
between male and female auditors. All of our effect sizes obtained, coupled with our previously
obtained p-values does seem to show a correlation between effect sizes and p-values. Which
supports a need for further study.
Overall, though my study has flaws, there were interesting results that merited further
study, such as differences between male and females opinion of the auditing profession, as well
as the differences between auditors that work for public companies and those that work for a notfor-profit entity. My study only looked at GCAS auditors, however future studies could expand
and look at other not-for-profit auditors. My interest in this study began due to an article I read
by Carnegie and Napier that looked at traditional accountants and business professions and how
to portray the profession after Enron. Using that article as a springboard, I wanted to look
specifically at how Enron and other financial scandals impacted how auditors perceived their
profession, as well as how they believed the public perceived their profession. Which is how my
study began. Though I wished the scope had been larger, what I learned as well as going through
the academic research process was helpful. Possessing a larger sample size would have enabled
more to be said, however it is my hope that this research will be a springboard for future research
on this topic. In all the comparisons run, perhaps the most pivotal conclusion I can offer is that
perceptions vary and the studies of how perceptions vary may help future generations better
understand their field and the impact reform has had upon it.
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Appendix 1 – Survey Questions
Before Enron, 10 Years Ago
Q1: Please indicate your agreement with the following statement. "Auditors were serving the public
interest first.”
Q2: Please indicate your agreement with the following statement. "The actions of auditors impacted
the publics’ perceptions of accountants”
Q3: Before the Enron scandal was known, were you proud to be an accountant?
Q4: Please indicate your agreement with the following statement. "The auditors at Arthur Andersen
were opportunistic"
Immediately After Enron, 9 Years Ago
Q5: Please indicate your agreement with the following statement "The Collapse of Enron could have
been avoided"
Q6: Please indicate your agreement with the following statement "Arthur Andersen betrayed the
publics’ trust, and their responsibilities as auditors"
Q7: Please indicate your agreement with the following statement, "Arthur Andersen could have
prevented the Enron failure from occurring"
Q8: In the immediate aftermath of the Enron scandal, were you proud to be an accountant?
Q9: Please indicate your agreement with the following statement, "Reforms were needed to restore the
stereotypes of the public towards both auditors and accountants as a whole”
Today
Q10: Please indicate your agreement with the following “Changes that have been made thus far have
positively impacted the auditing profession”
Q11: Please indicate your agreement with the following “The Auditors Involved in the Enron scandal
had a conflict of interest"
Q12: Please indicate your agreement with the following “The public trusts auditors to do their jobs
honestly”
Q13: Please indicate your agreement with the following “Sarbanes-Oxley was necessary to help
restore the publics’ trust”
Q14: Please indicate your agreement with the following “The auditing profession should be self
regulated again”
Q15: Please indicate your agreement with the following “Today’s auditors serve the public interest
first"
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